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ABSTRACT 
Until five years ago the scene of public transport in Brazilian cities was dominated by privately 
operated buses under local protective regulation. From 1996 on, however, this scene begun to change 
by the emergence of vans operators who challenged bus cartels and the barriers to entry imposed by 
public authorities. In this paper, a general overview of the presence of vans in Brazilian local public 
transport is provided. Quantitative, regulatory and political facts are presented and analyzed. 
Furthermore, present trends related to regulatory policies concerning vans are assessed and possible 
developments regarding its presence in passenger transport markets are discussed. 
INTRODUCTION
Until mid-90s, and with very few exceptions, the scene of public transport in Brazilian cities was 
dominated by the massive presence of privately operated buses under local protective regulation. The 
general anticompetitive character of regulatory framework of local bus industry in Brazil has been 
defined elsewhere (Santos and Brasileiro, 1996; Aragão and Santos, 1999). From 1996 on, however, 
this scene begun to change by the emergence of vans operators who challenged at the same time the 
economic and political power of bus cartels and the barriers to entry imposed by public authorities. 
In general, vans operators were largely supported by the general public, especially captive bus users 
who were interested in more service provision coming from new suppliers. Although there may be 
found some opposition to vans between users, mainly due to informal character of activity and to 
frequent unacceptable high-speed driving, public support to vans could be politically felt. This support 
was really the main responsible for the political recognizing of van public transport significance and, 
lately, for the incorporation of vans operation in the regulatory framework concerning transport in 
many Brazilian cities. Other local Administrations have chosen to be until now in a position of 
accepting the presence of vans without regulating the service at all. In other ones, however, vans were 
deterred or banned from the streets. 
In this paper, a general overview of the presence of vans in Brazilian local public transport is 
provided. Firstly, a brief historical introduction to the problem ends with a schematic description of 
institutional framework of urban public transportation in Brazil. Following this, facts concerning the 
growth of signification of vans in Brazilian cities after mid-90s are presented in a way that links that 
growth with socioeconomic, demographic and technical aspects. Then, comments on different 
reactions of local transport authorities, bus operators and users, as well as vans operators' behaviors, 
are done and their interactions are briefly explored. Finally, a general conception of the phenomenon 
is formulated and present trends related to regulatory policies concerning vans are assessed. 
Conclusions are developed having these trends in mind in such way that possible developments 
regarding vans presence in passenger transport markets are discussed. 
HISTORICAL BRIEFING AND THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IN MID-90s 
Informal urban transport has a large tradition in Brazil, with its roots in the accelerated urbanization 
following the Second W orld W ar. Before those years of growing industrialization, Brazilian cities' 
transportation needs were generally fulfilled by electric tramways and, in some cases, suburban 
railways. Although railways were then passing to public operators, monopolistic private 
concessionaires controlled urban tramways with exclusive rights. Beginning in the 40s, new transport 
demands raised that could not be answered by rail modes due to difficulties in importing components 
and in raising sufficient funds for new investments: extension of urbanized area with a first wave of 
suburban sprawling required the building of new rail routes and growth of rolling stock in order to 
achieve reasonable levels of service. 
In this market vacuum, independent road carriers —  usually individual or familiar firms —  begun to 
offer transport services in peripheral urban settlements. Also, in cities like Rio de Janeiro, selective 
road services were offered in consolidated routes, directly competing against trams. In the absence of 
operational modernization, trams and trains loosed progressively their market shares in the same 
rhythm that competitive road carriers improved their organization in the direction of a more 
concentrated business. W ith or without state acquisition or incorporation of tram and railway 
companies, rail modes were almost completely banned from urban markets around 1960. It should be 
remarked here that public authorities could use competitive presence of informal road carriers as a 
political arm in their conflicts with monopolistic concessionaires regarding fare revisions or service 
cuts.
Those independent road carriers were the matrix of today bus enterprise in Brazil. From the 60s on, 
bus business in Brazilian urban agglomerations has been growing and growing as population raised 
and cities became more complex and expanded territorially. It is important to say that all over the 
period public regulation of urban bus industry in Brazil restricted internal competition between the 
incumbents and protected them from new entrants in the market on the basis of periodically renewed 
concession contracts without significant requirements regarding operational improvement or 
productivity gains. Singular exceptions may be mentioned although with residual significance: the 
case of irregular buses — the piratas in Rio and São Paulo — , operated by informal producers using 
old and badly conserved vehicles, normally in metropolitan medium distance routes; the illegal kombis
in the periphery of Metropolitan Recife; the use of taxis as collective vehicles — the morning and 
evening lotadas as they are known in Rio. 
In this context, public authorities became, with rare exceptions, accommodated in a position of 
services monitoring, frequently busied with fare and system's deficit administration. Without financial 
conditions to improve urban road infrastructure for public transport, with very limited possibilities of 
implementing mass transit network projects — more than exceptions, Metros in Rio and São Paulo 
may be highlighted as examples of low public capacity in develop and really implement mass transit 
options —, authorities saw their effective power being diminished as faced to political and economic 
power of bus enterprises. 
Economically concentrated, very often behaving as local cartels, bus enterprises were prone to turn 
into a nationally amalgamated business with fusion, acquisition and merging processes being the rule 
in the eighties and first nineties. In this process, local authorities were becoming more and more 
fragile, both politically and technically. Again, a few exceptions may be pointed out that states the 
general rule: Curitiba and Recife remained with their transport system well managed by strong 
authorities, local one in the former case, metropolitan authority in the latter.   
All these factors have been understood as the rationale for explaining why an initially competitive and 
dynamic industry followed the way to become a non-reacting, inertial one, without being able to 
perceive new market demands and users' needs. And, in fact, the early 90s were the years when urban 
public transport markets in Brazil consolidated too many rapid changes. These can be summarized as 
follows:
x Motorization rates were growing under national policy on "popular cars" 
x As a consequence, captive demand for public transport was diminishing 
x Spatial hierarchy policies for retailing, public health and education were being implemented and 
resulting in reduction of motorized traveling 
x Urban structures became more complex what implied in a relative loss of importance of traditional 
transit corridors 
x New desire lines emerged that did not present sufficient demand for mid-sized or big buses: 
x Street congestion resulted in less vehicular productivity associated with greater users' costs in 
travel time and discomfort 
x Lastly, relatively expensive fares practiced by bus operation opened up attractive spaces for the 
supply of alternative services. 
As they had lost capacity for perceiving and comprehending new market orientations, bus cartels were 
not able to understand the market signs, except for some examples of selective services as practiced in 
greater cities as Rio and São Paulo (frescões, condominium services and so on): real mass transit by 
bus remained a poor service used by no more than those without any option. New entrants in the 
market could then approach demand with a segmented supply, except for financial, technological and 
regulatory barriers to entry. 
CONTESTING BARRIERS TO NEW ENTRANTS: THE "VANS" EMERGENCE 
Once the demand-side conditions for deep changes in public transport market were already given 
around 1995, those barriers stood due to supply-side limitations. But new macroeconomic policies 
changes laid down financial and technological barriers.  These changes can be classified as follows: 
x New automotive regimes gave rise to easiness of vehicular importation, specially vans with a 
reasonable degree of adjustment to their use in collective transport 
x Exchange rates were favorable to importation and imported vans were relatively cheap 
x Global expansion of greatest car manufacturers results in the installation of all relevant ones in 
Brazil or in Mercosur (Argentina mainly) 
x Privatization of state enterprises was accompanied by a “qualified unemployment”, graduated 
professionals — with financial capacity due to demission or early retirement pecuniary 
compensation — interested in establishing their own business 
x Growth of informal economy resulting in the existence of people interested in trying new forms of 
working and obtaining income 
x Better credit conditions with longer amortization periods and lower effective interest rates. 
After the concretion of above conditions just one kind of barrier was not laid down: the regulatory one. 
But, in general, with some few exceptions, transport authorities and institutions had become fragile 
faced to the economic and political power of bus operators. And regulatory barriers may always be 
contested in practice if perceived benefits may supersede real costs and perceived risks. 
As a general rule, vans were introduced in very singular niches of public transport market: first 
entrance is addressed to intermunicipal routes between peripheral communities and city centers. There 
are some reasons for this choice: market regulation in Brazil is such that intermunicipal, although 
metropolitan, bus transport has much higher fares than intramunicipal ones; tutelage of intermunicipal 
public transport belongs to regional — e.g., State — authorities (exception for Metropolitan Recife, 
Vitória and Goiânia where all metropolitan transport system is under the control of a Metropolitan 
authority) that are not well fitted to monitoring and controlling urban transport; peripheral urban 
populations has grown more quickly than more central ones and former neighborhoods are not so well 
served by urban services as latter ones; longer the routes, more advantages in travel time, headways 
and geographical coverage are exhibited by faster and more comfortable vans (if just seated 
passengers are admitted). 
Usually, unless police is used — remember the fragility of public transport authorities and think about 
its available personal for controlling irregular operation —, first new entrants are well succeeded. 
Short-term profitability of pioneers attracts new vans operators until singularly good market niches are 
saturated. If conditions for entrance remain then, “second-best” niches are targeted and so on, until 
more structured routes with reasonable bus services are attacked. So, beginning with entrance 
situations in which competitive pressure put by vans is not significant from a systemic point of view, 
they can spread their operations over metropolitan space since when local or regional authorities are 
not able to rapidly deter entrance. In these cases, a short-term contestable market is built because 
regulation as practiced permits almost totally free entrance. Furthermore, if incumbents also react 
slowly and remain for a long time arguing for police intervention a successful significant entry is 
observed.  
Of course, process does not develop quietly and without reactions. In some moment, incumbent 
operators and/or public authorities react more or less vigorously. The timing and intensity of reactions, 
as well the degree of success achieved by them, depend upon local conditions: prevalent quality of bus 
services, public confidence regarding transport authorities, organization and power of bus business, 
and (very important) political relationships between local Governments, and between them — mainly 
that of core municipality — and State authorities. Some cases may be mentioned for illustration: 
x In Natal, the irruption and growth of vans in 1996 was largely eased by the proximity of local 
elections — State authorities did not intervene because they were interested in operators support to 
their candidates to municipal Governments 
x In Curitiba, the presence of vans is not too significant until today largely due to the quality of bus 
operation and the public support to municipal transportation agency 
x In Rio and São Paulo, the boom of vans is largely explained by the absence of a real public power 
controlling operations, what can be the reason for the fact — frequently cited by vans antagonists 
— that vans market is under the control of mafias.
REACTIONS TO VANS: FROM DETERRENCE TO ACCOMODATION 
It is worthy to note that above mentioned conditions do not apply uniformly in Brazilian cities. So, the 
dynamics of reacting and counter reacting process — a matter of political analysis — is strongly 
defined by very local characteristics and conjunctures. Nevertheless, systematization may be useful 
regarding the overview nature of this document. 
Regarding to public authorities, it is possible to define a typology of behaviors. Three different types 
of reaction may be identified, although a local authority may have mixed behavior or assume 
sequentially two different types. They are: 
x Transport authority makes a strong decision in pro of preserving status quo;
x Transport authority deters vans entrance without too much emphasis and proceeds in order to a 
formal regularization of some quantity of entrants; 
x Transport authority remains apathetic and does not define precisely its position. 
In the first possibility, where it is possible to see Recife’s, Curitiba’s or Belo Horizonte’s initial 
reaction, police and officials of transport controlling are distributed in streets to virtually ban the vans. 
Some authorities in this case are interested in maintaining their power over the complete public 
transport system and vans intrusion disturbs what is understood as a well-functioning public service. 
But, in other cases, this reaction may be seen as a defense of incumbents’ interests, not public ones: a 
bad-functioning system should not be preserved but transformed and vans emergence could aid this 
public purpose. Maceió and Teresina have shown this kind of behavior to defend an operationally 
inefficient bus service. 
Of course, this kind of public authority position is strongly proposed and supported by NTU, the 
National Association of Urban Transport Enterprises, and ANTP, the National Association for Public 
Transport. A slightly distinct solution that is being adopted somewhere (Vitória, for example) is to 
emulate the well-known 20-years old experience of Porto Alegre with the lotações. The decision in 
these cases is to use quasi-buses (20-26 seats) largely operated by incumbents themselves or by new 
actors in order to fulfill market niches opened to vans. This practice uses to be performed as an answer 
to public questioning about “why not alternative transport”. It is noticeable that the use of mini and 
microbuses by incumbents has been registered in many cities other than those with this first position. 
The second possibility, where we may find Brasília, Natal, Fortaleza, Campinas, as pioneers, Belo 
Horizonte (today), Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and many other cities, police power is used not to ban all 
vans from the streets but to try to contain the cumulative process of entrance. The main idea behind 
this kind of behavior seems to be exploiting the private informal initiative in improving transport 
supply and in putting an effective competitive pressure on bus operators. Sometimes, however, this 
behavior is not decided just-in-time and decision is taken under political pressure when the problem is 
no more under authorities’ control. This is the case of São Paulo and, partially, of Rio. Another 
problem with this positioning regards the quantity of regularization: if low, more possibilities that 
excluded operators come back again irregularly; if high, poor vans services will be achieved in the 
medium term due to market saturation and low profitability. Finally, another problem with this 
decision is that of political integration of authorities in a Metropolitan Area: if local and regional 
authorities disagree about the timing and nature of regularization, or one of them does not implement 
any solution, then the problem shall remain. This is the case of Natal, where the lack of a State real 
decision on regularization is causing problems to locally regulated vans operators due to the entrance 
of non-regulated ones in the routes awarded through competitive tendering processes. Brasília has a 
similar problem now-a-days and is opening other niches for new entrants: the neighborhood transport, 
some thing like the condominium transport of Barra da Tijuca, Rio de Janeiro, but operated by vans.  
The third possibility, where we may mention São Paulo and Rio initial position and also the great 
majority of State authorities, is generally an intermediate position. Under political pressure put by bus 
and vans operators, or by users, or by politicians, the authority in this case tends to approach one of the 
precedent possibilities. The worst in this case is that, in general, this decision is out of time and the 
size of problem is then more difficult to handle with. To mention a case: nine thousand operators 
answered the calling of Rio de Janeiro Municipality in order to register as candidates to regularization. 
Tendering for vans routes in São Paulo would have regularized four thousand operators while around 
ten thousand others would remain illegal.   
It is important to remark that public authorities reveal in their decision taking the result of political 
pressures, e.g. the political relative weights of bus operators, vans operators and users, as well the 
political conflicts internal to the political game orients and forms public decisions with more strength 
than technical opinions. 
Examining now the bus operators, it is possible to conclude that their positions in the conflict have 
followed a national orientation. This is possible because now-a-days NTU represents significant 
quantity of relevant operators. Local associations reflect this position. The bus operators’ reaction may 
be summarized in four axes: 
x Organized pressure upon public authorities requiring more police action in order to ban vans from 
the streets, combined with attempts to develop some form of partnership with public authorities 
regarding monitoring emergence or presence of vans 
x Once public decision is partial regularization of vans, political pressure in order to model 
regulation in the sense of controlling vans expansion in the market (the permission to individual 
operators, limitations of vehicular technology and so on) 
x Changes in their own operation in order to better compete with vans attraction to users 
(microbuses just-seated, fleet expansion, operations management better fitted to user needs, like 
express buses, air-conditioning) 
x Media campaigns dedicated to break the public image of vans (said to be irresponsible, predator,
taxdefrauder and so on) and to better their own image (as responsible, taxpayers).
Users, in their turn, have generally assumed very segmented positions, as it could be waited. As the 
vans represented, in any way, an additional supply of transport, the first reaction of user is to be in 
favor of vans. But this position is not permanent. Tastes and opinions are formed in the use, and part 
of the users does not accept some characteristics of van operation, mainly speed and lack of traffic 
security relatively to the buses. Other kind of users remarks the speed and the short travel time, also 
relative to buses, as the main criteria orienting their choice in pro of vans. In some cities, more 
comfortable vans like MB-Sprinters have attracted female passengers in a greater proportion than male 
ones. 
Public opinion obtained by interviews in São Paulo, Rio, Natal e Recife, nevertheless the distinctive 
features of vans operations in these urban areas, converge to highlight greater operational speed, e.g. 
lower travel time, as the most important criteria for evaluating the service. But users disclaim the very 
differences between vehicular models in vans, a failure they do not observe in buses. Politically, it 
seems that users tend to assume a positive opinion respect vans because they perceive the operator as 
an equal, while the bus enterprise don’t try to understand their needs. Qualitative research on the 
theme performed in São Paulo, Natal and Rio seems to support this statement, a very normal reaction 
of those who have been a long period under monopolistic practices and abuses. 
Faced to these positions of authorities, competitors and users, vans operators have been reacting in 
many ways. Where the service is regulated, some conflicts emerge from the disparity between the 
informality they are used to and the requirements imposed on the service by authorities. In Natal and 
Fortaleza, for example, many drivers do not respect route definition or does not intend to operate full 
period. The associations and unions are not as representative as necessary to guide general operator 
behavior. So, it is possible to talk about many levels of quality in vans operation, including in the same 
urban area. There are routes in which operators are extremely careful with the relationship with users, 
with car maintenance and cleaning, with security in driving and so on. In other routes, there are not 
these conditions. Another problem with vans operators’ reactions is the trend to become violent in 
defending their market spaces. The case of São Paulo, where the problem seems to be out of public 
control and where connections between vans business and criminal activities have been appointed, is a 
serious advertising regarding the need that public authorities have to act promptly in order to maintain 
the possibilities of using vans as an instrument for improving general public transport. 
Positive results emerging from the irruption of vans in urban transport market in Brazil are sufficient 
as to state that public benefits may be obtained if public authorities are able to recognize that vans 
have a place in the supply of transport services. This place may be thought of in two dimensions: 
coordination and competition. In the following item, it is presented briefly a conception of vans 
presence in urban public transit networks that is fitted to these dimensions.  
      
VANS: THEIR ROLE IN A NEW PERSPECTIVE FOR URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORT 
Urban public transport in Brazil is now in a deep crisis. Although too many causes may be appointed 
for this, regarding the objectives of this paper it is sufficient an interpretation of the current crisis as 
the reflection of caducity of a certain regulatory framework developed and adopted in the sector over 
the period 1960-1990. The most distinguished factors of this framework are: restricted competition for 
and in the market, uniformity of technical solutions (in the vehicular sense as well as in the 
organizational and operational one), lack of permanent incentive for innovation and 
quality/productivity rises. 
The emergence of vans brought to intellectual and technical debate around the future of Brazilian 
urban transport at least two reflections: the possibilities of a competitive cohabitation of distinct 
vehicular technologies, distinct operational solutions and different organizational arrangements. Vans 
in Brazil are not as just as small sized vehicles. In Goiânia, for example, former vans operators were 
so able to organize their presence in local market that today they are all running microbuses (19 to 25 
seats). Here, the important feature is no more the vehicle but the kind of cooperative arrangement 
between individual operators. So, alternative operators running vans or microbuses also represent a 
more flexible operation and a more dynamic organization. The answers of some public authorities, as 
in Natal, Fortaleza, Campinas and others, to the emergence of vans were able to show that it is 
possible to develop a integrated regulatory framework where each combination of mode, vehicle size, 
operations and management organization can proportionate a solution for special market needs. 
This systemic regulatory approach will not be constructed in a day (Aragão e Santos, 1999). But it is 
promising in the sense that it may offer a solution for the present crisis. In the transition phase, 
conflicts will remain intense and new problems will be appointed. But structural changes in regulation 
are the only correct answer to structural changes in the market. The nature of urban transport markets 
permits to think about a regulatory portfolio governing a supply based on diversified technology and 
promoting an equally diversified type of property, from large firms to familiar ones. 
In this context, vans or microbuses could be operated in various forms: 
x Feeder circuits to structural rail, water or bus main routes (intermodal coordination and better 
conditions for public transport to face the private automobile growth) 
x Competitive transport supply in links where demand is too low for a bus line with reasonable 
headways (enhancing the qualitative and quantitative presence of public transport in the general 
transport market of urban agglomerations)  
x Competitive supply over bus routes, especially those with high daily demand variation (thus, 
putting effective competitive pressure on bus industry) 
x Special night services, school transport and transport related with events 
x Neighborhood transport 
These possibilities are not entirely present in regulatory trends for urban public transport in Brazilian 
cities. But they can be seen partially in many regularization procedures adopted to accommodate vans 
operators in the transport system. On the other side, vans operators initiatives are also recognizing 
some of these market niches. In Rio, for instance, the concessionaire of suburban railway is 
negotiating with a cooperative of vans operators a collective contract regarding feeder services 
connecting communities that shall loose their train station, closed due to low demand. In Brasilia, 
neighborhood transport permissions are being considered to be operated with vans. In many cities, by-
night and events-related transport is a real option, as well as special services to colleges and schools. 
In Natal and Fortaleza, local vans were regulated with a limited but real purpose of putting 
competitive pressure on bus incumbents. 
Being able to recognize market signs and to explore competitive advantages of vans may help local 
regulators to improve regulatory framework in a direction of better fulfilling the public interest. 
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